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LABOR LAW

DidAmtrak DerailAn Employee's
Right to Union Representation?
ByJay E.Grenig

Paul G. landers
V.

National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Docket No. 86-2037)
Argued March29,1988

ISSUE
This case presents the question of whether a railroad and
a union representing a bargaining unit of its employees may
enter Into a collective bargaining agreement providing that
only the bargaining representative may represent those employees in company-level disciplinary and grievance
proceedings.
FACdrS
Paul Landers is employed as a passenger engineer by
Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corporation). He is a
member of the United Transportation Union (UTU), although Amtrak passenger engineers are represented by the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) for purposes of
contract negotiation. UTU represents engine attendants, passenger conductors and assistant conductors employed by
Amtrak.
The contract between BLE and Amtrak sets the terms and
conditions of employment for the passenger engineers, including discipline and investigation rules. The rules provide
that the passenger engineer and the "duly accredited representative will have the right to be present" during disciplinary investigations and that the engineer or duly accredited
representative may process appeals of any claim, grievance,
or disciplinary action. The rules define the BLE as the "duly
accredited representative."
If unsuccessful at the company-level, a passenger engineer may submit the dispute to binding arbitration before
the National Railroad Adjustment Board where the engineer
"may be heard In person, by counsel, or by other representatives" in accordance with the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The
RLA provides that grievances involving the interpretation or
application of the collective bargaining agreement shall be
handled in the "usual manner" at the company-level.
In 1984, Landers was charged with misconduct while
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working as a passenger engineer. At the investigatory hearing
Into the charges, Landers appeared and represented himself.
His request that he be represented by UTU was rejected by
Amtrak, which advised him that under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, he could only be represented by the duly accredited representative of his craft-the
BLE.
Subsequently, Amtrak concluded the disciplinary charges
against Landers had been proven and suspended Landers for
thirty days. Landers did not appeal his suspension to the
National Railroad Adjustment Board.
The lower courts rejected Landers' claim that he was
entitled to representation by UTU at the company-level
proceedings (814 F. 2d 41 (1stCir. 1987)).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Compulsory unionism was forbidden by the RLA until
1951. In 1951, Congress amended the RLA to authorize
compulsory union membership, but provided that a railroad
operating employee may belong to "any one of the labor
organizations, national in scope, organized in accordance
with this chapter and admitting to membership employees of
a craft or class" in any of the specified services. This amendment was apparently intended to avoid situations where
operating employees, who had a long tradition of job progression from one craft to another, would have to belong to
more than one union or frequently change union membership.
In McElroy v. Terminal RJZ Ass'n of St. Louis (392 F.2d
966 (1968)), the Seventh Circuit held that railway employees
could process their grievances themselves or through a
minority union. The court concluded that an exclusive
grievance representation provision In the labor agreement
violated the RLA.
It has been asserted that the McElroy decision conflicts
with rulings under section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (which does not cover railway employees) and that
the decision is also inconsistent with certain prior decisions
under the RLA which established that railroad employees in
the non-operating crafts were not entitled to representation
in company-level proceedings by an attorney or an official
from a union other than the designated craft representative.
For example, In Virginian Railway Co.v. System Federation (300 U.S. 515 (1937)), the Supreme Court held that the
"obligation imposed on the employer by the RLA to treat
with the true representative of the employees is exclusive"
and "Imposes the affirmative duty to treat only with the true
PREVIEW

representative, and hence the negative duty to treat with no
other."
Several cases since McElroy have read that decision as
complying with the freedom of union choice policy expressed in the RLA and have suggested that any extension of
the exclusivity of bargaining representation to Include company-level grievance and disciplinary proceedings may be
illegal under the RLA (Taylor v. MissouriPacflc R.Co., 794
F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1986) and United TransportationUnion
v. Taylor, 104 S.Ct. 670 (1986)).
Since the Seventh Circuit's decision in McElroy, railroad
management and labor, particularly the labor organizations
representing operating employees, such as locomotive engineers, have lacked express guidance on the question of
whether the Railway Labor Act makes unlawful a provision in
a labor agreement limiting union representation In grievance
handling at the company-level to the craft-designated bargaining representative.
A definitive ruling on this issue by the Supreme Court
could bring some measure of stability to the collective
bargaining relationships In the railway industry. However, a
decision will only affect railroad employees in the operating
crafts who exercise their right to belong to a union other than
the union which represents the craft in contract negotiation.
In addition, it will only affect railroads which disallow
minority union participation at the lower stages of the
grievance proceeding. Finally, the decision will not affect a
railroad employee's right to be represented by the minority
union at the arbitration proceedings before the National
Railway Adjustment Board.
ARGUMENTS
For Paul G. Landers (Counsel of Record, Clinton J.Miller,
111, 14600 Detroit Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44107-4250; telephone (216) 228-9400)

IssueNo. 13

1. The right to be represented by a railway employee's own
union In disciplinary hearings before the employer is a
necessary incident of the employee's right to belong to
that union.
2. Landers has been deprived of the assistance of his union
at one of the most critical moments In employment-a
disciplinary Investigation.
For the National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Counsel of
Record, Joanna L. Moorhead, 400 N Capitol Street, NW
Washington, DC20001; telephone (202) 383-2216)
1. Employers and labor unions are free to negotiate procedures for handling company-level disciplinary and grievance proceedings, including restrictions on employee
representatives.
2. The "usual manner" at Amtrak for processing grievances
at the company-level is to restrict representation of employees to the collective bargaining representative.
For the Broterhood of Locomotive Engineers (Counsel
of Record, HaroldA. Ross 1548 StandardBuildin& 1370
OntarioStreet, Cleveland, OH 44113; telephone (216) 8611313)
1. The RLA permits contractual provisions limiting representation at company-level proceedings to the craft
representative.
2. The sole purpose of the alternative union membership
provision of the RLA is to prevent compulsory dual union
membership on carriers having intercraft transfers.
AMICUS BRIEF
In Support ofNetber Party
The AFL-CIO and the Railway Labor Executives' Association filed a brief describing the National Labor Relations Act
law with regard to the exclusive representation principle.
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